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COPYRIGHT LAW-COMPUTER PROGRAMS-The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that all computer programs are copyrightable
regardless of their function.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984) (order affirming preliminary injunction).
Formula International Inc., (Formula) is a wholesaler of electri-
cal parts and electronic kits.' It does not manufacture any of the
components it sells and derives only a small percentage of its gross
revenues from the sale of computers.2
Apple Computer, Inc., s (Apple) manufactures and markets com-
puters, related peripheral equipment and computer programs, in-
cluding the five programs at issue in this case."
1. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1984).
Among the electrical components and devices Formula sold have been devices designed to
decode scrambled television signals transmitted by pay television companies. See Brief of
Apple, Inc. at 6 n.2, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief of Apple, Inc.].
2. 725 F.2d at 526. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775,
777 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
3. Established in 1976, Apple pioneered the personal computer concept and is cur-
rently the second largest manufacturer (behind IBM) of personal computers in the industry
with total sales in 1983 of $982.7 million. Apple Computer's Counterattack Against IBM,
Bus. WK., Jan. 16, 1984, at 78. Its first model, the Apple II, is the world's most widely used
personal computer with some 1.4 million units installed. Id.
4. The five programs at issue were:
1. Autostart ROM-performs internal routines that turn on the circuits in the com-
puter when the computer's power is turned on. It makes the physical parts of the
computer (e.g. input/output devices, screen, and memory) ready for use.
2. Applesoft-Apple's version of the Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction
Code (BASIC) language.
3. HELLO-is the first program executed after the power is turned on. It determines
how much Random Access Memory (RAM) is in the computer and which version of
BASIC needs to be loaded into the computer.
4. DOS 3.3-the disk operating system program which provides the instructions nec-
essary to control the operation between the disk system (disk drive) and the com-
puter itself.
5. Apple Integer BASIC-a translator program like Applesoft, it uses Apple's first
version of BASIC and implements a simpler version of the Applesoft program.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.4 (3rd Cir.
1983). All five programs were registered under the Federal Copyright Act. Each diskette
bears the copyright notice on its face and each ROM bears the notice either printed on the
ROM or immediately next to the ROM on the circuit board to which the ROM is affixed.
See Apple Computer, Inc., v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 776-77 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 411(a) (1982).
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In May, 1982, Formula began selling a computer kit under the
trade name "Pineapple."5 The computer was designed to be com-
patible with a vast library of application software written for a
home computer manufactured by Apple, the Apple II. Formula's
computer kit 7 contained two unauthorized copies' of Apple's com-
puter programs ."Autostart" and "Applesoft." These programs
were stored on memory devices called ROM's. 10 Apple produced
evidence that Formula had copied and sold three other programs
for which Apple held the copyright, "HELLO," DOS 3.3" and "Ap-
ple Integer BASIC."" These three programs were stored on disket-
tes.12 All five of these programs had been previously published by
5. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 522. There was evidence
that the computer kits were assembled by independent concerns in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Formula acknowledged that some of these concerns made the kits and components accord-
ing to Formula's instructions and specifications. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. at 777. See Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc. at 4-5, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Formula Int'l].
6. 725 F.2d at 522. One of the by-products of Apple's success is the development, by
independent third parties, of packaged application programs (e.g., accounting, word process-
,ing, games, etc.) written specifically for the Apple II operating system. The demand for
application programs written specifically for home computers, including the Apple II, has
led to the creation of an entire industry that may sell $10 billion in software in 1984.
Software: The New Driving Force, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 74.
7. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 777. "The 'Pine-
apple' kit, when assembled, was virtually indistinguishable in appearance from the Apple
II." Subsequent modifications to the computer housing changed its exterior appearance so
that it looked "somewhat less like" the Apple II exterior. Id. See also Brief of Apple, Inc.,
supra note 1, at 6.
8. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 777. Formula con-
ceded that it imported and sold as part of the Pineapple kit silicon chips (ROM's) that
contained unauthorized, "virtually identical" copies of Apple's programs. Id. Brief of Apple,
Inc., supra note 1, at 5. The differences between the copyrighted works in suit, if any, and
the copies sold by Formula were minimal. One of the programs sold with the Pineapple kits
still contained the initials of the Apple programmer who had written the program. Id. at 6.
9. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc. 562 F. Supp. at 776. See infra note 14.
10. 562 F. Supp. at 778. ROM is an abbreviation for read-only-memory, a type of pre-
programmed memory that holds certain start-up programs vital to the computer's use (e.g.,
HELLO and Autostart ROM; see infra note 14). A ROM consists of a semiconductor chip
that has been photochemically or electrically treated to store minute "bits" of information
as electrical signals that are either "on" or "off." 562 F. Supp. at 778. The pattern, sequence
and frequency with which these switches are activated instructs the computer to perform
certain functions. The entire pattern imprinted on the ROM makes up what is usually
called a computer program. Id. The contents in the ROM are permanently fixed by the
manufacturer; the memory can only be read, not erased or rewritten. See Note, Copyright
Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1725 n.21 (1983). A.
OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO MICROCOMPUTERS, §§ 3-1 to 3-5 (2d ed. 1980).
11. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc. 725 F.2d at 523. See Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F.Supp. at 776. See also infra note 14.
12. Id. A diskette or "floppy disk" is a type of memory device. It is a circular piece of
mylar or other plastic-like material that is coated with metallic oxide. The diskette is
458
1985 Recent Decisions
Apple in various forms in either object code 3 or source code, 4 or
both."5
Apple filed suit in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338,16 alleging
that Formula International, Inc. was liable for copyright infringe-
ment 17 of five computer programs,6 trademark infringement,"9 pat-
housed in a jacket, and when inserted into the disk drive it spins inside the jacket. A read/
write recording head records and reads information from the magnetic surface. See L.
HOENSTEIN, COMPUTER PERIPHERALS FOR MINICOMPUTERS, MICROPROCESSORS AND PERSONAL
COMPUTERS 199-202 (1980); D. SPENCER, DEVELOPING COMPUTER LITERACY 104 (1983).
13. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 778. Computer pro-
grams are a detailed sequence of instructions which can be written in any of three levels of
computer language. Id. A computer can "understand" and execute programs only in ma-
chine language, the "lowest" level computer language. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1243. Machine language is a binary language using two sym-
bols, 0 and 1, to indicate an open or closed electrical switch that is stored on the ROM. A
machine language instruction (e.g., 01101001) is called a "bit." Id. Statements written in
machine language are referred to as written in "object code." Id. See also Note, supra note
10, at 1724-25.
14. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1243. To facilitate
the human programmer in reading and writing programs, "higher" level languages exist
(e.g., BASIC and COBOL). These languages use English words and symbols that are easier
to use and understand than machine language. Statements written in a high level language
are referred to as being written in source code. Id. See also Note, supra note 10, at 1725.
15. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 778. See also
Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1 at 3 n.4.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) states:
a. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.
b. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a
claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under
the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws.
Id.
17. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 776-77. Apple's copy-
right infringement claim centered around the allegation that Formula copied several of Ap-
ple's original computer programs which were embodied in memory devices and registered
with the United States Copyright Office. Id. See also Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1, at 2.
18. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 777. By statutory
definition a "computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101, as
amended by Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980). To be copy-
rightable, a computer program must be an original work that is "fixed" or embodied in any
tangible medium of expression from which the program can be perceived with or without
the aid of a machine or device. Id. See also Tandy Corp. v. Personal MicroComputers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal 1981) (computer program held to be a work of authorship);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer
program is a "literary work" within the meaning of Copyright Act of 1976 and is protected
from unauthorized copying, whether in its source code or object code versions).
19. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 777. Apple's trade-
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ent infringement, 0  and unfair competition 21 with respect to
Formula's marketing of the "Pineapple" computer kit.2 Formula
counterclaimed for antitrust violations and unfair competition and
sought declaratory relief as to the validity of certain patents and
copyrights.2 " After a brief discovery period, Apple moved for a pre-
liminary injunction based on its copyright and patent infringement
claims and on its unfair competition claim.24 The district court
granted the motion for preliminary injunction. 5
The computer programs at issue were "operating system pro-
grams," which are designed to manage the internal flow of infor-
mation within the computer.26 These programs differ from "appli-
mark infringement claim centered around the allegation that Formula infringed on Apple's
registered trademarks by adoption of the "Pineapple" name. Id. Apple asserted that in rela-
tion to the marketing of its products, the company adopted the unique name "Apple" which
was registered in the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
See Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1, at 2. Apple claimed to have extensively advertised
and promoted this trademark, that it was a vehicle for distinguishing Apple products from
their competitors and that consumers associated this name with high quality computer
products. Id. Apple introduced evidence that Formula sold peripheral products for use with
personal computers that utilized, without authorization, the name "Apple-Mate" and the
"Apple" name itself. Id. at 6.
20. Apple Computers, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 777. The complaint
charged Formula with infringement of two of Apple's patents hut that claim was not an
issue on appeal. Id.
21. Id. Apple's unfair competition claim was centered on (1) alleged misappropriation
of the fruit of Apple's efforts in developing an integral computer component called a
"Mother Board" (the main circuit board of a microcomputer), and (2) alleged palming off
resulting from the use of similar names in similar marketing channels. ("Palming off" is a
term of art indicating the act of making the consumer believe he is buying from a competi-
tor when in fact the consumer is buying from the infringing company. See William R.
Warner & Co. v. Eli C. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)). Id. See also Videotronics, Inc. v.
Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983) (quoting 2 T. McCARTHY, TRADE-
MARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 10:25 at 322 (1973) (setting forth the three point test for
unfair competition: 1) Plaintiff has made a substantial investment of time, effort and money
into creating the thing misappropriated such that the court can characterize that "thing" as
a kind of property right; 2) defendant has appropriated the thing at little or no cost, such
that the court can characterize defendant's actions as "reaping where it has not sown," and
3) defendant has injured plaintiff by misappropriation.)).
22. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc. 725 F.2d at 522-23.
23. Id. at 523.
24. Id.
25. Id, at 522. The preliminary injunction enjoined Formula from copying computer
programs having copyrights registered to Apple, from importing, selling, distributing or ad-
vertising those copies, and from using the mark "Pineapple" or any other mark or name
confusingly similar to the trademarks used by Apple. Id.
26. Id. at 523. Operating system programs control the communications between the
central processing unit (CPU) and the various peripheral (input/output) devices such as
disk drives, printers, etc., and assist in the efficient writing, transmission and use of applica-
tion programs. See also Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1, at 4. Apple's program DOS 3.3 is
an example of an operating system program. See supra note 4.
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cation programs," which are programs that interact directly with
the computer user.27 The application program must interface ex-
actly with the operating system in order for the computer to "un-
derstand" and execute the instructions.2
Formula did not dispute Apple's claim that it copied and sold
each of the five programs at issue.29 Instead, Formula based its de-
fense on the premise that because these programs control the in-
ternal operation of the computer, they are "ideas" or "processes,"
and therefore are not protected by copyright.30 Formula also relied
on the idea/expression dichotomy recognized in case law3 in con-
tending that a computer program is protected under the Copyright
Act only if the program embodies "expression," which is communi-
cated to the user when the program is run on a computer.
3 2
Judge Ferguson first considered the standard of review for grant-
ing a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, explaining that
to obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show either likeli-
hood of success on the merits and possibility of irreparable injury,
or the existence of serious questions going to the merits of the case
and balance of hardships tipping in the movant's favor.3" Judge
27. 725 F.2d at 523. Application programs are designed to perform specific tasks for
the user such as word processing, accounting and game playing, and require the interaction
of the computer user with the program. See Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1, at 4.
28. 725 F.2d at 523. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F.
Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
29. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 777. See also Brief of
Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 5.
30. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 523. See also Brief of
Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 15.
31. 725 F.2d at 524. Formula relied on the principles announced in Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 841, 844 (1879) (enunciating the difference between "expression" and "idea"), and
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163-64 (9th
Cir. 1977) (the task in copyright infringement action is to determine whether there has been
copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea itself). See also Brief of
Formula Int'l, Inc, supra note 5, at 13-19.
32. 725 F.2d at 524. See also Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 25-26.
33. 725 F.2d at 523 (citing Beltran v. Myers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982); Alek-
ganik Natives Ltd. v. Andrus, 648 F.2d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1980)). See William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1975) (the greater the
balance of hardships tips in favor of the moving party, the less likelihood of success on the
merits must be shown). See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197,
1201 (9th Cir. 1980). The appellate court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.
upheld the lower court's implicit rejection of the Third Circuit standard for a preliminary
injunction, that is, that (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits must be shown,
and (2) that irreparable injury to the plaintiff that exceeds any injury to the enjoined defen-
dant must be demonstrated. For a full explanation of the Third Circuit standard, see Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F.Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
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Ferguson further explained that the scope of review on appeal of a
preliminary injunction is limited" and that the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction must be affirmed unless the dis-
trict court abused its discretion or based its decision on an errone-
ous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact.35
The circuit court, in considering the grant of the preliminary in-
junction, first focused its attention on Apple's copyright infringe-
ment claim, and held that the district court did not commit error
in finding a likelihood of success of the merits in proving actiona-
ble infringement of Apple's copyrights and the possibility of irrep-
arable injury in Apple's claim." The court found that Formula's
reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy, i.e. that computer pro-
grams are copyrightable only if they provide expression to the
computer user, was not supported by the language of the Copy-
right Act,37 the legislative history of the Act nor the existing case
law concerning the copyrightability of computer programs.3 8 The
court further held that 17 U.S.C. § 101 extends protection to all
computer programs regardless of the function which these pro-
grams perform.3
The court noted that under the Copyright Act,' 0 Apple's certifi-
cates of copyright registration constituted prima facie evidence of
the validity of Apple's copyrights and held that a showing of rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits in a copyright infringe-
ment claim raises a presumption of irreparable harm." The court
34. 725 F.2d at 523 (citing Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press International, Inc., 686
F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1982)).
35. Id. (citing Beltran v. Myers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982)).
36. In two other decisions in the Ninth Circuit a preliminary injunction was issued on
the basis of similar circumstances. See Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management & Assis-
tance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 718 at 719-20 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
37. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
38. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 524.
39. Id. at 525 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) and the FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHT WORKS [hereinafter CONTU],
H.R. REP. No. 1581, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6849. See also Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1477 (D.
Nev. 1983); S & H Computer Systems, Inc. v. SAS Institute, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D.
Tenn. 1983).
40. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1982), as amended by Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028
(1980).
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 410(c), 411(a). See 725 F.2d at 525. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1254 (a showing of a prima facie case of copyright
infringement or reasonable likelihood of success on the merits raises a presumption of irrep-
arable harm). Id. Accord Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
Vol. 23:457
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also noted the considerable investment of time and money that
Apple had expended in the development of the computer programs
and that wholesale copying of these programs would jeopardize
Apple's investment and competitive position.
The court next focused its attention on Apple's trademark in-
fringement claim. Judge Ferguson explained that the standards for
granting a preliminary injunction in trademark infringement and
copyright infringement claims are the same. 43 The court rejected
Formula's contention that the district court committed error in re-
fusing to consider the factors set forth in AMF v. Sleekcraft
Boats"' in determining whether a likelihood of confusion of the
parties' trademarks existed." Judge Ferguson held that the proper
time for giving full consideration to the factors set out in Sleek-
craft Boats is when the merits of the case are tried.40 Therefore,
appellate review of the preliminary injunction is limited to whether
the court applied the proper legal standard for the preliminary in-
607, 620 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). See also Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). One commen-
tator has suggested that in this area the courts are erecting a conclusive presumption in
favor of irreparable harm upon a showing that a significant investment in time and money
was spent in developing computer programs. Since virtually every software copyright case
will involve the expenditure of significant time, effort and money, this commentator sug-
gests that an injunction will automatically issue in every case. See Grogan, The Broader
Meanings of Apple v. Franklin in the Development of Compatible Operating Systems and
in Determining Standards for Injunctive Relief, reprinted in 1 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 15,
20 (1984).
42. 725 F.2d at 525-26. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d at 1245 (creation of Apple programs required 45 man-months and cost more than
$740,000.00). Id.
43. 725 F.2d at 526.
44. 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (factors for finding a likelihood of confusion
are:. 1) strength of mark, 2) proximity of the goods, 3) similarity of the marks, 4) evidence of
actual confusion, 5) marketing channels used, 6) type of goods and degree of care likely to
be exercised, 7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and 8) likelihood of expansion of
the product lines). The holding in AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, however, fails to support
Formula's position because when, as in this case, "the goods produced by the alleged in-
fringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner, infringement usually will be
found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be expected." Id. at 348. "Sev-
eral other factors are added to the calculus" only "when the goods are related but not com-
petitive." Id. Accord Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1129
(2d Cir. 1982) ("a number of different factors must be considered when . . . the products
are not in direct competition"). Id. See also Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1, at 21.
45. 725 F.2d at 526.
46. Id. (citing Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1979) (in granting
a preliminary injunction, the parties will not have had a full opportunity to either develop
or present their cases and the district court will have had only a brief opportunity to con-
sider the factors relevant to the likelihood of confusion determination). 725 F.2d at 526.
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junction and whether there was an abuse of discretion by the dis-
trict court.4'
Judge Ferguson found that there was no dispute with respect to
whether the district court applied the proper standard and that
based on the evidence presented, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that the addition of the prefix "Pine"
to the trademark "Apple" presented a likelihood of confusion.'8
The court went on to hold that once Apple demonstrated a likeli-
hood of success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim,
the district court could have reasonably concluded that continuing
infringement would result in a loss of control by Apple over its
reputation and a loss of goodwill.' 9 Judge Ferguson noted that
Formula only recently entered the computer market and that its
computer sales constituted a minor percentage of its total sales.
Thus, the court held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in concluding that continuing infringement by Formula
presented a possibility of irreparable harm to Apple and that the
balance of the hardships tipped in Apple's favor.50
Recent case decisions and new developments in the computer in-
dustry have focused increased attention on copyright as a means
for protecting proprietary rights in computer programs. Beginning
with the decision in Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS & A Group,
47. Id.
48. Id. "Likelihood of confusion is the test of both common-law trademark infringe-
ment and federal trademark infringement." 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 23:1 at 34-35 (1973). The court found that a likelihood of confusion might exist
because both Apple and Formula sell similar products through similar marketing channels
and Formula intended to expand its product line into assembled computers. Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 526. In noting that under these circumstances
there was no clear abuse of discretion in finding a likelihood of confusion, the court found
that one of the possible effects of the use of the prefix may be to suggest that the computer
kits are manufactured by licensees or subsidiaries of Apple. Id. (citing Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724 (D. Minn. 1965). See also Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 497 (2d Cir. 1962) (the name "Safeway
Properties" was likely to cause confusion with the name "Safeway Stores" notwithstanding
the difference in suffixes). Id. Accord National Van Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.
1956); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Lab., 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953);
Ronson Corp. v. Maruman, Inc., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 523 (S.D. Cal. 1963)).
49. Id. See also Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753
(8th Cir. 1980) (to allow defendant's use of the term would allow him to wrongfully profit
from plaintiff's reputation and goodwill and result in business losses to plaintiffs); St. Ives
Lab., Inc. v. Nature's Own Lab., 529 F. Supp. 347, 350 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (to allow defendant's
continued infringement would result in "loss of goodwill and control over its reputation [and
would] constitute irreparable injury.").
50. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 526.
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Inc.,51 several courts have heard arguments challenging the availa-
bility of copyright protection for computer programs. In the in-
stant case, Formula had expressly conceded a number of positions
which were contested by the previous parties in copyright litigation
involving computer programs.52 The focus of recent challenges has
shifted from attacks on whether a computer program stored on a
ROM constitutes a copy of the original work53 and whether a com-
puter program embodied in object code constitutes copyrightable
expression," to attacks on whether operating system programs are
the appropriate subject matter of copyright protection. 55 The
Ninth Circuit's holding in Apple Computer v. Formula Interna-
tional concludes that computer programs which control the inter-
nal operation of a computer are entitled to copyright protection
despite the contention that they are only "ideas" or "processes"
which do not embody "expression" which is "communicated" to
51. 480 F. Supp 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (embodiment of a computer program on a ROM
chip does not result in the creation of a copy of the program), aff'd on other grounds, 628
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). It has been suggested that the court of appeals implicitly reversed
the district court on the issue of copyright protection for computer programs stored in
ROM. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 at 8-106.3 n.18 (1981). See also Williams Elecs.,
Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982). The district court's analysis in Data
Cash has been expressly rejected in the video game audiovisual copyright context in Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983),
and in the computer copyright context in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
52. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 778-79.
53. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1974); Williams
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohan, 564
F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb.
1981); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981). Cf. Stern Elecs., Inc.,
v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Note, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 329 (1982).
54. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 779. See Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983); Tandy Corp.
v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Data Cash Systems,
Inc., v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 628
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980); GCA Corp. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982). See
also Note, supra note 10.
55. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. v.
Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983); Hubco Data Products v. Management & Assis-
tance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983). See also Cohen, Software Protection:
Issues and Non-Issues Relating to Copyright Infringement of Operating Systems Pro-
grams, reprinted in SOFVWARE PROTECTION, THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SPEAKS ON THE
COMPUTER/COPYRIGHT INTERFACE 218-19 (1984) [hereinafter Software Protection].
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the computer user when the program is run.56 The court of ap-
peals, in affirming the district court's finding that Apple had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits in pressing its
copyright infringement claim, relied upon and strengthened a line
of cases from the Third Circuit, which began with Williams Elec-
tronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.5 7 and was followed by the
decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.58
Although this is the first ruling concerning the copyrightability of
operating system programs in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
this court and the district court appear to have relied on the same
rationale put forth in the Third Circuit opinions in Williams and
Apple v. Franklin. This developing line of cases places critical im-
portance on the language of the Copyright Act, the legislative his-
tory of the Act, the existing case law concerning the copyrightabili-
ty of computer programs and public policy.
The Third Circuit has pointed out that there is a distinction to
be drawn in the computer cases between protected "expression"
and unprotected "ideas" under the copyright laws.59 The court,
recognizing that distinction first addressed Formula's contention
that these programs are "ideas" or "processes" that are "functional
in nature" or "utilitarian" and as such, not protected by copyright
law. 0
Formula's characterization of operating systems programs in
these terms is not new to case law. Previous litigants in this area
have, like Formula, based their attacks on the language of section
102(b) of the Copyright Act.6 1 The Ninth Circuit rejected the dis-
tinction Formula was trying to draw between those programs that
56. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 523. Formula charac-
terized operating system programs as "only perform[ing] internal computer functions"
which should not be afforded copyright protection because they are "pure processes
that do not contain expression." Brief of Formula Int'l., Inc., supra note 5, at 17, 23.
57. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
For a thorough treatment of this significant case, see Note, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
lin Computer Corp. Puts the Byte Back into Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
14 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 281 (1984); Note, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 29 VELL. L. REV. 894 (1984).
59. Id. at 1251-53.
60. See Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 16, 17, 23.
61. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1982), as amended by Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028
(1980)). Section 102(b) states: "in no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." Id.
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are meant to interact with humans and those which control the
internal functions of the computer. 62 The court provided an exten-
sive examination of the legislative history and language of the act
which must be summarized here for clarity of the remaining
analysis.
In 1976, after considerable study, Congress enacted a new copy-
right law to replace that which had governed since 1909." This
new law greatly broadened the scope of copyright protection in
many areas. 64 Although the new law did not expressly enumerate
computer programs as copyrightable subject matter, certain defini-
tions and the legislative history of the Act indicated that Congress
intended such works to be protected as "literary works." Two
years earlier, in 1974, Congress had established the National Com-
mission on the New Technological Uses of Copyright Works
(CONTU)66 to consider the necessity of revising the copyright
laws. Among the problems Congress asked the Commission to con-
sider was the extent to which computer programs would be pro-
tected by the copyright laws.6
7
62. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 525.
63. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976).
64. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 779. See also Note,
supra note 10, at 1740-41:
That copyright law has evolved beyond its traditional purpose of encouraging disclos-
ure of original ideas is illustrated by the tremendous expansion in the kinds of works
that have been protected. Copyright no longer protects only works that convey ideas,
but now covers a list of commercial sundries, such as code books, door knockers, sun-
dials, fishbowls, and ashtrays.
Id. (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219-21 (1954)). The commentator concludes: "In
light of this evolution, copyright law can now be viewed as simply an anti-misappropriation
scheme that protects the fruits of intellectual labor." Note, supra note 10, at 1741.
65. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(1) (1982); See H.R. REP. No. 1746, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
51, 54-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws. 5659, 5667:
The term "literary works" does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualita-
tive value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instruc-
tional works and compilations of data. It also includes computer data bases and com-
puter programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's
expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.
Id. See also Baumgarten, Copyright & Computer Software (Including Data Bases & Chip
Technology), reprinted in SorrwARE PROTECTION, supra note 55, at 171.
66. Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
67. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 781. See H.R. RE.
No. 1581, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6849,
6855 (recognizing the "inadequacy of the present law to deal with the range of problems
arising from the use of copyrighted works in computer systems," Congress commanded
CONTU to "make recommendations as to such changes in copyright law or procedures that
may be necessary to assure for such purposes access to copyrighted works, and to provide
recognition of the rights of copyright owners"). See also Brief of Apple, Inc., supra note 1,
at 9 & n.10.
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The CONTU Final Report, issued on July 31, 1978, recom-
mended amending the 1976 Copyright Act "to make it explicit that
computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's
original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright."68 The
Commission also recommended amending section 101 of the Copy-
right Act to include a new definition of "computer program" and
repealing the status quo provision of section 117 by replacing it
with a section limiting exclusive rights in computer programs so as
"to ensure that rightful possessors of copies of computer programs
may use or adapt these copies for their use." '' The Commission
was not unanimous in its recommendations on this subject. Three
commissioners expressed opinions differing from those of the ma-
jority.70 The majority expressly considered and rejected those posi-
tions, indicating that the distinction that computer programs can
be copyrighted only when their use leads to copyrighted output is
not consistent with the clearly expressed design of the Copyright
Act of 1976, which was to protect all works of authorship from the
moment of their fixation in any tangible medium of expression.
7 1
Congress enacted the CONTU majority recommendations verba-
tim in the Software Copyright Act of 1980.72 The 1980 amend-
68. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 524. See CONTU REPORT,
1-2 (1979).
69. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1247-48. See
CONTU REPORT at 1,
70. 725 F.2d at 524. Commissioner Hershey dissented from the recommendation of the
majority, arguing that "the Act of 1976 should be amended to make it explicit that copy-
right protection does not extend to a computer program in the form in which it is capable of
being used to control computer operations." CONTU REPORT at 17 (Hershey, dissenting).
Hershey's dissent stemmed from a belief, similar to Formula's that "works of authorship
have always been intended to be circulated to human beings and to be used by them-to be
read, heard, or seen, for either pleasurable or practical ends. Computer programs, in their
mature phase, are addressed to machines." Id. The Apple Computer appellate court noted
that Commissioner Nimmer, while concurring in the Commission opinion and
recommendation,
provided a possible line of demarcation for computer programs to be considered in
the future if the Commission's recommendation proved to be too open ended. Nim-
mer suggested that it might be desirable to limit copyright protection for software to
those computer programs which produce works which themselves qualify for copy-
right protection.
725 F.2d at 524. See CONTU REPORT at 26-27 (Nimmer, concurring and dissenting). Com-
missioner Karpatkin, dissenting separately, characterized the majority view as "recom-
mending total and complete copyright protection for all computer programs," and argued
for more limited coverage. CONTU REPORT at 37 (Karpatkin, dissenting). See Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 781.
71. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 524.
72. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
The CONTU recommendations are codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117.
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ments added a broad definition of "computer program" to section
101 and substituted a new section 117 for the old status quo
provision."
The language of the new section 117, by carving out an exception
to the normal proscription against copying, clearly indicated that
computer programs, as defined in section 101, are copyrightable
and are otherwise afforded copyright protection.74 In view of the
new section 101 definition of a computer program, Formula's at-
tack on operating system programs as "methods" or "processes" is
inconsistent with its concession that application programs are an
appropriate subject of copyright since both types of programs are
sets of instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
to bring about a certain result.
75
The Third Circuit recognized a similar inconsistent position in
Apple v. Franklin and stated a conclusion which the Ninth Circuit
implicitly adopted in the instant case, that "both types of pro-
grams instruct the computer to do something. Therefore it should
make no difference for the purposes of section 102(b) whether
these instructions tell the computer to prepare an income tax re-
turn or translate a high level language program from source code to
object code form.''76 It is the all-inclusive terminology in the defini-
tion of a "computer program," contained in section 101, that the
Ninth Circuit considered in upholding the lower court's finding
that the language of the Copyright Act and its legislative history
make no distinction between the copyrightability of programs
which directly interact with the computer user and those which
simply manage the computer system.
Although the court found that no distinction exists between op-
73. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). Under the new section 101 a "computer program"
is defined as a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to being about a certain result. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The new section 117
provides that "it is not infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make
or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program," when
necessary, to "the utilization of the computer program" or "for archival purposes only." 17
U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
74. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1248. Accord Wil-
liams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) ("copyrightability of com-
puter programs is firmly established under the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act and
we need not consider the scope of prior acts.")
75. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 779-80. See also Brief
of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 13, 17, 23; Supplemental Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc.
at 2-3, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
Supp. Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc.].
76. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1251.
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erating system programs and application programs under the copy-
right law, Formula pressed a second argument which began with
the premise that "only computer programs which are an embodi-
ment of an author's artistic expression are subject to copyright
protection." 77 Formula had interpreted the term "expression" to
mean "that which is pleasing to the eyes and ears of lay persons. "78
Thus, Formula contended that Apple's programs should not be af-
forded copyright protection because they do not produce "expres-




To understand the subtle distinction Formula is trying to make,
a brief explanation of the nebulous area recognized in case law as
the idea/expression dichotomy will be required. The underlying
principles can be found in the Supreme Court's opinion in Baker v.
Selden.80 The holding in Baker reflects a broad principle that cop-
yright law protects only a particular expression of an idea, not the
idea itself.81 As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "This principle at-
tempts to reconcile two competing social interests: rewarding an
individual's creativity and effort while at the same time permitting
the nation to enjoy the benefits and progress from the use of the
same subject matter."82 The central issue in a copyright infringe-
ment action is to determine whether there has been copying of the
"expression" of the idea rather than the underlying "idea" itself.8 3
In some cases the idea and the expression of that idea will coincide
when the expression provides nothing new or additional to the
idea." As a guideline, the more complex and artistic the expression
77. See Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 13, 17, 23-24.
78. See id. at 23-24 (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977)).
79. See Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 23-24; Supp. Brief of Formula
Int'l, Inc., supra note 75, at 3-6.
80. 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (a valid copyright in a book does not bar others from using the
ideas or system set forth in the book).
81. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
82. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
83. Id. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (the drawing of the line between "ideas" and "expression" is not
easy); M. Milgram, Proprietary Rights in Software, reprinted in SoFrWARE PROTECTION,
supra note 55, at 328, 347 (1984); Note, supra note 10, at 1735. See also Atari, Inc., v. North
American Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982); Synercom Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
84. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1168 (9th Cir. 1977). See also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A]; Herbert Rosenthal Jew-
elry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (idea of a bejeweled bee pin not
protected by copyright in the work due to inseparability of idea and its expression because
470 Vol. 23:457
1985 Recent Decisions
of an idea, the more it will be separated from the underlying idea
and protected by copyright law.8 5 An idea and its expression may
merge and permit copying, if there are but a limited number of
ways of expressing that idea.86 Thus, the fundamental distinction
to be drawn is one between an artist's idea and his expression of
that idea. The Ninth Circuit rejected Formula's assertion that the
expression one must find is something that is communicated to the
computer user, calling that assertion "misplaced. '8 7 The court re-
affirmed that the distinction between idea and expression is in-
tended to prohibit the monopolization of an idea when there are a
limited number of ways of expressing that idea.88 The court found
that Apple did not seek to copyright the method which instructed
the computer to perform its operating functions but only Apple's
specific set of instructions themselves.89 The court found that Ap-
ple introduced evidence that numerous methods exist for writing
the programs involved in this case and that Formula did not dis-
pute that fact.90 Thus, Apple sought only to copyright its "expres-
sion" (a particular set of instructions) and not the underlying
"idea," (the computer process that would allow the CPU to com-
municate with peripheral equipment).9 The court recognized that
"when the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not
be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly
of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by
patent law.").
85. Id. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (copyright will protect as far as possible the expression adopted
by the author and still allow free use of the underlying idea).
86. The concept of merger was relied upon in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). Franklin argued that since there were only a
limited number of ways to arrange operating systems to enable a computer to run the vast
body of Apple-compatible software, the "idea" of Apple-compatibility and its "expression"
merged so that copyright protection was not afforded. The Third Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, stating that "Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility (arguably Formula's
objective) with independently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat
metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and their expressions have merged." 714 F.2d
at 1253. See also Morrisey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (copying
may not be an infringement where there are only limited number of ways of expressing an
idea); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982); Synercom
Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).




91. It appears that the court accepted Apple's assertion that "each work in suit con-
sisted of a complicated arrangement of sequenced lines of code designed as instructions to
accomplish a given data processing task in a particular manner." See Brief of Apple, Inc.,
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the "expression" in a computer program was the program itself
"which embodied a particular arrangement or sequence of symbols
that the programmer chose to adopt to accomplish a given data
processing task."'92 A point to be noted is that the court indicated
the door is still open for Formula and others to construct an Ap-
ple-compatible operating system through reverse engineering.9 3 As
the CONTU report indicated, "[o]ne is always free to make the
machine do the same thing as it would if it had the copyrighted
work placed in it, but only by one's own creative effort rather than
by piracy.
9 4
The court went on to address the last problem presented by
Formula's argument, that the "expression" embodied in a com-
puter program must be expression that is communicated to the
computer user.9 5 The suggestion that copyrightability depends on a
communicative function to individuals stems from the early case of
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co."' Congress, how-
supra note 1, at 10.
92. Id.
93. It is accepted practice that one is entitled to analyze products obtained on the
open market in order to discover the secrets or methods of operation embodied in those
products and to use this information to develop a similar product. The process of starting
with a known product and working backward to discover the process by which it was created
is referred to as "reverse engineering." See Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 476 (1974). See also Grogan, Proprietary Rights-Decompilation and Disassembly:
Undoing Software Protection, reprinted in SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 55, at 309.
Thus the court indicates that Formula would be free to study the Apple programs, note the
input and output formats and write its own operating system program that would mimic the
Apple program. See also Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (copyright in manuals explaining use of computer programs
and input formats not infringed by using this information to produce a competing program
that accepted identical input and produced an identical output); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement
World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981). Cf. S & H Computer Systems, Inc. v. SAS
Institute, 568 F. Supp. 416, 423 (1983) (insignificant alteration will not constitute indepen-
dent thought or creativity). See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. at 782.
94. See CONTU REPORT at 21.
95. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc. 725 F.2d at 525. Formula relied heavily
upon early case law in the computer program copyright area which involved video games.
Formula asserted that because these computer programs were found to be protected under
the copyright law and each one necessarily contained "expression" (i.e., shapes, sizes, colors,
sequences, sounds, etc.) that was communicated to the player, it was this type of "expres-
sion" that one must find in a program for copyright protection to apply. The fact, however,
that these programs produce expression to the player is incidental to the core concept that
the programs themselves are the expression of a video game designer's idea, for example, a
game "involving a spaceship combatting space rocks." See Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Md. 1981).
96. 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (a piano roll is not a copy of a musical composition because it is
not in a form people can perceive). See also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B][1](1983).
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ever, legislatively reversed the holding in White-Smith with the
1976 Copyright Act and ceased to exclude from copyright protec-
tion those works which could not be perceived except "with the aid
of a machine. 9 7 The court once again recognized and relied upon
the language of the 1976 Copyright Act and its history in declaring
that "the computer program when written embodies expression;
never has the Copyright Act required that the expression be com-
municated to a particular audience.""8 Thus the Ninth Circuit dis-
missed the last portion of Formula's argument in summary
fashion.
Although the court did not expressly address the issue, it ap-
pears to silently endorse the lower court's rationale regarding the
public policy argument that few companies will be willing to invest
the time and resources to develop new computer programs if their
products can be freely duplicated.99 The district court noted that if
Formula were left free to copy the programs, it could undersell Ap-
97. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 782. See 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1982). The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act supports this interpretation.
See H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 52; S. REP. No. 473, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5665:
This broad language is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustified distinc-
tions, derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.....
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation
may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written,
printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device
"now known or later developed."
Id.
Thus, as a "literary work," a computer program is protected by copyright even though its
only perceivable embodiment may be expressed in O's and l's or in hexadecimal code that
has no meaning to anyone except computer programmers. See Brief of Apple, Inc., supra
note 1, at 11. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (copyright embraces "works ... expressed in
words, numbers or other verbal or numerical symbols of indicia."); Reiss v. National Quota-
tion Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (plaintiff's cable code, consisting of "6,325
coined words of 5 letters each, numbered consecutively from 38,495 to 44, 819" which "had
no meaning" was held copyrightable, the court holding that "I can see no reason why works
should not be [protected literary works] because they communicate nothing."). Accord
Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937) (cypher code copyrightable).
98. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d at 525 (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (1982): "The Copyright Act extends protection to original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."). Accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at
1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l and rejecting contention that a
copyrightable work "must be intelligible to human beings."). See also S & H Computer
Systems v. SAS Institute, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 422-23 n.6 (1983).
99. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 783.
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ple because Formula would not have to recoup the substantial re-
search and development costs associated with developing these
programs. 100 The decision supports the district court's policy ra-
tionale, which took notice of the arguments by both parties as to
whether copyright is the best form of protection for computer pro-
grams. 10' The lower court decided that "[t]o the extent it was free
to declare public policy, its choice is to place computer programs
into an existing category of legal protection as against no protec-
tion at all."'1 2
In balancing the hardships the court dismissed Formula's claims
that it was at the critical position of just entering "the market and
that depriving Formula of the opportunity to sell [its] computer
kits with the interface which allows it to work with the large li-
brary of applications software, substantially inhibit[ed] Formula's
entry into the computer market."' 03 The court reiterated that
Formula had sold only forty-nine "Pineapple" kits, that revenues
from the sale of computer products constituted only a small per-
centage of Formula's total sales, and concluded, therefore, that the
harm to Formula would be minimal.
0 4
This holding appears to be consistent with case law which sug-
gests that advantages built upon a deliberately plagiarized product
do not give the borrower any standing to complain that his vested
interests will be disturbed. 0 5 Finally, the court implicitly acknowl-
100. Id.
101. Id. The idea/expression dichotomy which has caused problems in the copyright
area has led some commentators to suggest that other forms of existing protection are better
suited than copyright to protect computer programs. See Milgram, Proprietary Rights in
Software, reprinted in SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 55, at 327. Copyright protects
against copying only, not against independent creation of the same work. See also Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
Trade secret law protects against unauthorized use and disclosure of the underlying idea
but does not protect against independent development. Unprotected disclosure will forfeit
the trade secret rights. See Goldberg, Copyright and Computer Software-Protection, Pre-
emption and Practice, reprinted in SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 55, at 239, 290.
Patent law, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq., provides broader protection than copyright
but its drawbacks in the software area include requirements of novelty (not merely original-
ity as required by copyright), non-obviousness in context of prior art and expense and delay
in securing a patent. See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 290.
102. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc. 562 F. Supp. at 783.
103. 725 F.2d at 526. See also Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 27.
104. 725 F.2d at 526.
105. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620
(7th Cir. 1982). Accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1255
(3d Cir. 1983) ("Nor can we accept the district court's explanation which stressed the 'dev-
astating effect' of a preliminary injunction. . . . If that were the correct standard then a
knowing infringer would be permitted to construct its business around its infringement, a
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edged that with regard to the public interest, the priority is "to
preserve the integrity of the copyright laws which seek to en-
courage individual effort and creativity by granting valuable en-
forceable rights," 10 6 and not, as Formula suggested, to move to-
wards "standardization in operating system software.
10 7
In conclusion, the noteworthy holding in Apple v. Formula is
that all computer programs are entitled to copyright protection re-
gardless of their function. This holding clarifies and strengthens a
developing line of cases which began with the Third Circuit deci-
sion in Williams v. Artic International. It should be noted that
although the case was relatively easy to decide in the copyright
context because Formula made no effort to create an Apple-com-
patible operating system on its own, a more interesting problem
would have confronted the court if Formula had developed its own
compatible operating system through reverse engineering. Not-
withstanding its factual situation, the decision in Apple v.
Formula will prove quite useful in the expanding area of computer
law since it can be relied upon by software developers alleging cop-
yright infringement of their computer programs.
Richard F. Paciaroni
result we cannot condone."). See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659
F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In fashioning relief, the district court should not be overly
concerned with the prospective harm to [defendants]. A defendant has no right to expect a
return on investment from activities which violate the copyright laws. Once a determination
has been made that an infringement is involved, the continued profitability of [defendant's]
businesses is of secondary concern."), affd, 457 U.S. 1116 (1984).
106. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d at 620.
107. See Brief of Formula Int'l, Inc., supra note 5, at 19.
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